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 On regular bases, the Court of Justice of the European Union has been accused of being 
activist. However, the very nature of the European Union and the great complexity and 
diversity of the European Court of Justice’s case law imply that judicial activism in itself may 
mean different things. First used and widespread in the United States, the term was rapidly 
taken for granted and applied to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Yet, the notion of 
judicial activism has been extensively used by scholars and judges but its meaning has become 
more and more ambiguous. As American Judge Frank H. Easterbrook already put in 2002 
“Everyone scorns judicial “activism”, that notoriously slippery term” (2002: 1402). In fact, too 
often employed to explain a number of different, even contradictory, concepts, it has become 
increasingly risky to use it. This thesis does neither aim to provide a single and specific 
definition of the notion of judicial activism nor to bring a completely new approach to the term. 
Its purpose is rather to collect a wide body of scholarship, to gather the most top-cited theories, 
to link them to case law and other literature. Then, the objective is to create a typology of 
judicial activism to make it easier for the reader to understand and for the scholars to convey 
their theories more adequately.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since 1965, the literature on the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) 
judicial activism is constantly expanding. However, in the dense and flourishing literature on 
judicial activism, very few writers have worked on its meaning. Indeed, providing a definition 
of the term is highly elusive, even from the earliest years of the literature on judicial activism. 
On the one hand, this is due to the topic in itself and on the other hand, this is due to the 
nature of the scholarship. The first use of the term “judicial activism” can be traced back to 
the late 1940s in Fortune Magazine. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. used the term to refer to the 
fatality of a judge to make a political choice: “A wise judge knows that political choice is 
inevitable; he makes no false pretence of objectivity and consciously exercises the judicial 
power with an eye to social results” (Schlesinger 1947). This genesis underlines three crucial 
issues that had important implications for all the successive literature. First, the term was 
proposed by a non-lawyer and addressed to the audience of a popular magazine. And, the very 
essence of the word “activism” suggests the existence of an ideological core. This leads to the 
second and third issues: it has not only been employed in reference to the United States (US) 
Supreme Court judges but also at a time when the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was not 
created yet. Indeed, the genesis of the label “judicial activism” highlights the geographical 
and temporal particularities involved. Since this very particular use of the term, applied to a 
specific situation and context, the notion has been increasingly used, first to denounce the 
behaviour of the nine judges of the US Supreme Court and then widespread on the other side 
of the Atlantic.  
 As early as the creation of the ECJ, D.G. Valentine (1965) wrote a book, which 
includes a substantial part on the political role of the ECJ (Hatzopoulos 2013: 103). Four 
years later, A.W. Green (1969) devoted a book to the issue of judicial activism at the 
European Court of Justice. In 1986, H. Rasmussen publicly accused the Court of being 
activist and he drew on no less than thirteen scholars and four judges who had already largely 
covered the issue (Hatzopoulos 2013: 103). His ideas were further developed by a number of 
scholars, including M. Cappelletti (1987), J.H.H. Weiler (1987), A. Arnull (1996) and, R. 
Dehousse (1998) (Hatzopoulos 2013: 103). Since then, the meaning of the term has too often 
been taken for granted and the scholarship on this subject is now rich, with a wide range of 
publications in distinguished journals and academic presses. Precisely because the term 
embodies much specificity and refers to different contexts, it has tended to serve as a function 
of those specificities and contexts instead of being handled as a topic on its own. Thus, the 
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topic is not only challenging, but the literature has also had difficulties to adapt to it. Indeed, 
even if many scholars have worked on judicial activism in specific periods of time and 
according to their field of study – whether legal, social or political – a little minority of them 
have tried to move beyond the mere debate of the (alleged) activist bias of the ECJ 
(Hatzopoulos 2013: 105) and to build models and typologies of the Court’s legal behaviour. 
And only few authors have analysed the topic in light of the characteristics of the EU system 
as a whole. 
 First, the European Union (EU) is often considered as a constant stimulus. Yet, “we 
need to see responses to the EU as changing responses to a changing stimulus” (Szczerbiak 
and Taggart 2018: 18). It is a construction for peace, prosperity and mobility but it is also a 
hybrid, multi-level system made of a complex set of institutions, policy-making and decision-
making processes, laws and regulations covering a large range of areas (Flood and Soborski 
2018: 36). Second, the so-called process of judicisation of politics has consistently made the 
contrast between the political and judicial even more difficult to identify in European polities. 
The unprecedented nature of the EU has made the Court the supreme judicial arbiter with 
regard to the application of EU law, thus making it automatically involved in European Union 
governance since it reaches decision that are collectively binding for the EU Member States 
(Kingston 2011: 133). And because the European Court of Justice operates through a so-
called “magic triangle”: direct effect1, supremacy2 and preliminary ruling3, it often combines 
both legal and political interpretations (Barani 2007: 42). This complexity often leads to 
different interpretations and opinions. Thus, accusations of judicial activism arise because 
there is no commonly agreed meaning and because that meaning is divided into various and 
often conflicting objectives and values (Dawson 2013: 30).  In the meantime, EU Treaty 
might treat these values equally, which make the possibility of reconciling them even more 
complex (Dawson 2013: 30; Beck 2012: 77). Thus, due to this legislative ambiguity, the 
Court is forced to make a choice or to operate a balancing test (Dawson 2013: 30). As a result, 
the ECJ constantly challenges the literature and brings it to review its academic archetypes in 
order to accommodate with contemporary European realities (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002: 
24).  
																																																								
1 Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1963, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & 
Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 26-62 
2 Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., Case 6-64 
3 See Article 267 TFEU	
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 Thus, the author will attempt to answer the following question: can the sole notion of 
judicial activism be used to qualify the ECJ’s legal reasoning in judgments deemed 
controversial4? This thesis aims to provide a three-fold contribution to the study of judicial 
activism in the EU. First, because the term has since acquired multiple facets, the literature is 
divided on what judicial activism means. As this contribution is limited in length, the author 
will present and organise the most widely accepted theories and ideas on judicial activism to 
provide an overview of the work that has already been done in this field. Second, this 
contribution will explain and analyse some concepts, mechanisms and procedures within the 
EU, which could have led to accusation of judicial activism. Thirdly, based on the literature 
review and explanations provided in the first two chapters, the author will build a typology of 
judicial activism in order to differentiate between all the theories for the sake of linguistic 
accuracy and better understanding. By building this model, she does not aim to take any side 
in the debate, to refute any approaches nor to develop a completely new theory but rather to 
combine all the applications of the term for more technical use.   
I. Judicial Activism: the Emergence and Development of a Field of Study 
 
 A. Defining judicial activism 
 
 In the early years of the literature on judicial activism, Sir Patrick Neill (1995) 
published The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism, in which he 
criticises the legal literature for not conducting sufficient “critical analysis” of the Court’s 
case law. In other words, he argues that the early academic literature on Community law 
focused mainly on explaining the EU institutional structure and was not sufficiently critical of 
the Court. In his publication, he gathers a number of judgments where he accused the ECJ of 
being activist and pursuing a federalist agenda. In this sense, he perceived the Court of Justice 
as a potential threat to the institutional system of the United Kingdom. Thus, in his 
publication, the notion of judicial activism lies in Neill’s national political orientation, which 
disagreed with the authority granted to the Court in the Treaty. Few years later, Keenan D. 
Kmiec (2004) provided an in-depth analysis of the different meanings of judicial activism. He 
collected five main definitions that have been used in the United States to describe the 
concept of judicial activism. According to the first definition, the Court is activist when it 																																																								
4 By controversial, the author means all the decisions that have been contested at any given point of time 
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invalidates a piece of enacted legislation. In other words, when the Court voluntarily limits 
the work reserved to other government bodies. Secondly, the Court can be accused of 
activism when it disregards “horizontal precedent”, that is to say its previous decisions but 
also when it departs from a decision reached by a higher court, i.e. “vertical precedent” 
(Kmiec 2004: 1466-1469). However, according to Kmiec, it may not always be proper to 
follow a previous decision in cases where, for instance, a court deems a previous decision as 
not being faithful to the principles set down in the Constitution. When a court disregards 
precedents, it must be bore in mind that courts do not necessarily treat every kinds of law 
similarly (Kmiec 2004: 1469). Thus, when a court disregards common law precedents, this is 
because it deems the lower courts more able to change the law (Kmiec 2004: 1469).  The third 
definition is one of the most used nowadays to describe the phenomenon: when a court 
intervenes in the legislative process by trying to create law, i.e. so-called “judge-made law”. 
However, here, the notion of judicial activism is used to criticise the Supreme Court’s 
behaviour in certain situations and thus may confuse the reader about the difference between a 
court behaving in an inappropriate manner and a court being “activist”. The fourth definition 
departs from the idea that, when a court interprets the Constitution following “established 
canons of interpretation” or when it relies on different tools to reach a decision, it may lead to 
judicial activism (Kmiec 2004: 1974). However, this definition is hard to follow since judges 
do not necessarily agree on the appropriate way to read the Constitution. Finally, the fifth 
definition is called “result-oriented judging” (Kmiec 2004: 1975). A court is said activist 
when the decision it reaches deviates from the objective of a case: when it “has an ulterior 
motive for making the ruling” (Kmiec 2004: 1476). However, Kmiec does not necessarily 
defend one definition over another and the term still remains confusing. In addition, his work 
has been conducted to clarify the notion of judicial activism as it is used in the United States’ 
long-standing judicial branches. But the EU Courts’ must be studied within the EU system as 
a whole which is itself complex and in constant evolution.  
 Nevertheless, contemporary literature on judicial activism has tended to rely on some 
of the abovementioned definitions without necessarily calling them into question. Indeed, 
over the years, the term as acquired a wide range of meanings, which make the term virtually 
unchallenged. For instance, the collectively written book Judicial Activism at the European 
Court of Justice comprises 12 chapters on the topic but only two authors provide some sort of 
definitions. The first author, Maartje de Visser (2013), argues that judicial activism has been 
used to refer to the ‘proper role’ of the Court, judge-made law and the legitimacy of the 
Court. According to de Visser, the notion is to a large extent employed by politicians, the 
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media and the public to express disagreement with a specific decision or interpretation of case 
law (2013: 188). However, given the great complexity and diversity of the European Court of 
Justice’s case law, expressing disagreement can take various forms and be oriented around a 
specific issue according to the case at hand. Indeed, it is also highly subjective since it lies in 
the values and political orientation of the one who disagrees. Put differently, one may 
disagree with a specific decision the ECJ has reached whereas another individual can agree 
with the Court on a similar judgment because its reasoning is in line with his own beliefs and 
interests. Interestingly, the second author, Anthony Arnull (2013), suggests that accusing a 
court of judicial activism is more than just disagreeing with it on some specific decisions. 
According to him, an activist court is a court that goes beyond what is provided for in the 
Treaty and abuses its powers (Arnull 2013: 215). However, he stresses that a number of 
decisions taken by the EU Courts – which have been criticised as activist – were not reached 
contra legem, which means that the Treaty excludes EU action. Arnull recalls that the Treaties 
have been designed collectively and are the results of lengthy diplomatic compromises (2013: 
225). In other words, some parts of the Treaties have been left ambiguous, thus often leading 
to disagreements. And it was made clear that the EU Courts should be in charge of solving 
these disagreements (Arnull 2013: 225). In this sense, Arnull argues that the decisions in Van 
Gend en Loos5  and Costa v Enel6 on direct effect and primacy of EU law cannot be 
considered as activist. Moreover, he argues that there is still no common agreement among 
the academics on the notion of judicial activism. And, given the great divergence of opinion 
among the literature, he believes that it would be useless to find universal agreement on the 
legal orientation the ECJ should take (Arnull 2013: 230-1). Accordingly, this is precisely why 
it is necessary to draw a typology of the term in order to avoid misunderstanding and overlap 
among the literature.   
 
 B. Judge-made law: an argument for judicial activism 
 
  Legal realism is one of the leading theories that provide an understanding of what 
judicial activism means. The theory lies in the US legal tradition and aims at studying the 
behaviour of judges and how they make decisions. And, it is often argued that justice is “what 																																																								
5 Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1963, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & 
Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 26-62  
6 See Costa v E.N.E.L., above n 2	
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judges ate for breakfast”. In other words, the decisions reached by a judge depend on a variety 
of personal factors. In What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision-
Making, Alex Kozinski (1993) clarifies the theory and argues that “legal rules don’t mean 
much anyway, (...) judges can reach any result they wish by invoking the right incantation, 
they should engraft their own political philosophy onto the decision-making process (....)” 
(1993: 993).  He then suggests that American judges have a considerable room of manoeuvre, 
by directly interpreting the wording of the Constitution (1993: 994). This theory directly 
echoes the supreme character of the ECJ discussed in the introduction. Indeed, the Court of 
Justice of the EU also enjoys a large room of manoeuvre in the interpretation of EU law 
through its case law, thus making it the ultimate architect of the European edifice. David T. 
Keeling (1998) claims that many pieces of EU legislation have been left ambiguous, thus 
obliging the Court to interpret them. Moreover, as it will be explained in Chapter II, the Court 
must often deal with conflicting policy ideas. He argues that the Court had to make a hard 
choice when determining which policy orientations should predominate (Keeling 1998: 510). 
And this is precisely this responsibility that led to allegations of judge-made law. Similarly, 
Henri de Waele and Anna van der Vleuten (2011) conducted a study whereby they found that 
the ECJ has been activist in the field of EU competition law. They argue that the Continental 
Can7 judgment is an example of the absence of precise rules with regards to merger control in 
any EU sources, which pave the way to “judge-made” law in this field of EU law.  
 Henri de Waele (2010) gathered several arguments from different sides of the debate 
on judicial activism: those who strongly argue against the ECJ’s judicial activism and those 
who tend to believe that judicial activism is inevitable. By judicial activism, de Waele means 
that the ECJ interprets the law. The Court has indeed already proved to interpret the law, but 
because the legal wording in the Treaties has been left vague, thus forcing the Court to 
interpret it. As a result, it seems doubtful to accuse the Court of judicial activism while one of 
its duties is to give preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Union law or the validity of acts 
adopted by the institutions8. Moreover, De Waele’s use of judicial activism is confusing since 
he tends to apply this no consensus-based concept to the entire ECJ’s case law.  
 For several years, Ronald Dworkin has defended the idea that there can be “right 
answers to controversial legal questions” (Dworkin 1986: ix). By “right”, he does not mean 
																																																								
7 Judgment of the Court of 21 February 1973, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. 
v Commission of the European Communities, Case 6-72 
8 Article 19 Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 
May BARTH  The Different Sides of Judicial Activism at  
the European Court of Justice 
	 10	
that there is one single, universally agreed, answer to one question; it is rather a matter of 
morality. Similarly, the same year, Posner called into question the applicability of the notion 
of judicial activism. According to him, what matters is to determine when a judicial decision 
can be characterised as right. He argues that the theoretical concept of legal realism is useful 
but is not sufficient to interpret a judicial decision. Only time will determine whether judicial 
decisions are right (1986: 217). However, even if Posner’s work calls into question the use of 
judicial activism, there is still a need to define what a “right decision” is. Indeed, when a 
Court is ruling there is always a decision that is to be made so, when a decision can be proved 
right in cases where the law is silent? 
 Finally, new legal realism aims to go beyond the old legal realism and to challenge 
hypotheses on the role of law and politics in judicial decisions. It is based on a quantitative 
approach, using a series of statistical analysis. According to Miles and Sunstein (2007), new 
legal realism has discovered that race, sex and other demographic data could have had an 
impact on judicial judgments (2007: 1). Similarly, Matthew Gabel (2003) has studied the 
selection process of the ECJ judges. Even if there is no available evidence of the ECJ’s judges 
voting behaviour, he found that, once judges are appointed, they tend to legislate by trying to 
have an impact on public policy outcomes (Gabel 2003: 13). Therefore, he assumes that 
judges at the ECJ tend to share the same policy preferences as that of their national 
governments (Gabel 2003: 6). Drawing on this conclusion, the ECJ acts as a rational actor 
that adopts strategies going into that direction. However, his theory clearly undermines the 
principle of independence of the judges enshrined in Article 19 (2) TEU. In addition, it seems 
doubtful to use the theory to understand how the ECJ reaches decisions. On the one hand, the 
Court rules on a supranational level and therefore has to deal with 28 judges coming from 28 
Member States with different judicial tradition and multiple political affiliations. On the other 
hand, ECJ judges voting behaviour are kept secret. 
 
 C. Interpreting judicial activism: two sides of the same coin? 
 
 Another branch of the literature on judicial activism has put forward two main 
arguments on several occasions and over time. Some authors have defended the idea that EU 
Member States influence the ECJ whereas others think that the ECJ follows a communautaire 
approach, i.e. the Court reaches decisions in accordance with the Union’s interests.  
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 On the one hand, scholars have argued that the ECJ is to a large extent influenced by 
national governments. For instance, in 2013, Pavel Belchev wrote that the European Court of 
Justice has been to a large extent more inclined to favor the “big” Member States when 
modifying the EU treaties and the institutional framework. By accusing the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) of “judicial activism” in this sense, Belchev directly calls into 
question the principle of impartiality and independence of the Court set out in Article 19 of 
the Treaty on the European Union (EU), which provides that the Court shall ensure that the 
law of the Treaties is observed. 
 On the other hand, some scholars have suggested that the ECJ is largely shaping 
national laws to serve the integrationist interests of European law. Karen Alter ascertains that 
the ECJ has been “doctrinally activist” by avoiding any political interference (1998: 139). She 
argues that the Court has been able to reinforce its powers because politicians and judges 
follow a different timeframe (1998: 122). Thus, due to these “different time horizons”, the 
Court has been able to create legal doctrine without any political interference (Alter 1998: 
120). More precisely, she explains that politicians tend to work on short-term solutions in 
order to satisfy their electorate and to stay in office (Alter 1998: 130). In doing so, they are 
more inclined to disregard ECJ’s decisions, which are more on the long-term (Alter 1998: 
130). Similarly, governments tend to follow the Court’s rulings as long as they do not bear 
long-term costs. Thus, the Court has been “doctrinally activist” since it has been able to build 
precedent and incrementally expand its powers while successfully avoiding any political 
contestation (Alter 1998: 131). In Integration-through-Law, Antoine Vauchez (2008) studied 
how law should be implemented. He believes that European treaties cannot be effectively 
implemented if European law is not supreme over national law. Similarly, he claims that both 
direct effect and preliminary rulings principles are necessary to ensure a homogeneous 
application of European law across the European Union. By recognising the need for EU law 
supremacy, Vauchez’s argument seems to stand on the pro-integrationist and pro-
supranationalist sides. In 2004, Rachel Cichowski showed that, with regards to women rights, 
the Court of Justice tends to act as a rational actor. According to him, the supranational 
character of the EU has expanded the scope of EU law and entitled individuals to enforce 
European law through the national courts system of a EU national government, thus not 
having to wait anymore for the Commission to bring a legal action against the Member State 
concerned for non-compliance with its international obligations. In 2010, Alec Stone Sweet 
also argued that the ECJ has been to a large extent pro-integrationist by privileging 
supranational norms over national laws. Similarly, Sabine Saurugger and Fabien Terpan 
May BARTH  The Different Sides of Judicial Activism at  
the European Court of Justice 
	 12	
(2014) asked whether the Court, through its “activism” exert a major influence on the 
European Union. They analyse whether the Court modifies the state of the law, substantially 
on its own initiative, by an evolutionary interpretation (Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 60). They 
found that the CJEU does not exercise such a major influence if it does not substantially alter 
the state of the law or if it restricts itself to a strict interpretation of the treaties and secondary 
law (Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 60). The Court would have fashioned European governance 
through its jurisprudence, both at constitutional and legislative level. This phenomenon is 
generally referred to as "jurisprudential activism" (Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 62). 
According to them, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice is usually explained by two main 
reasons: the independence of the Court and its federalist lecture of the European construction 
(Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 63). They also believe that, while the CJEU was largely 
glorified in the literature in the 1980s and 1990s, highlighting its influence and its 
jurisprudential activism, it has since been the subject of increasingly sceptical analyses with 
regards to its expansive role in contemporary European governance (Saurugger and Terpan 
2014: 74). The authors thus ask whether, since the 2000s, the Court has entered a period of 
restraint putting an end to this activist tradition and would no longer be central to the 
integration process. In their article, they have shown that this observation must be highly 
nuanced. The Court remains a key player in the growing number of areas where European 
integration continues to progress on the basis of legislative acts and legal coercion (Saurugger 
and Terpan 2014: 74).   
 
 D. Applying the notion of judicial activism to a specific area of EU law 
 
 Another range of scholars went further in the debate by specifically concerning 
themselves with a specific area of EU law. For instance, a large part of the debate has been 
about the interaction between the market-oriented Court’s rulings and the fundamental rights. 
The Post-Chicago economic theories rejected the leading theory that actors act rationally and 
as a consequence have an impact on market regulation (Chalmers 2015: 949). More 
specifically, EU competition law was first influenced by the German idea of ordoliberalism, 
which promotes the freedom of other economic actors to intervene in the market. Thus, a 
large part of scholars have accused the ECJ of judicial activism because it often tends to 
favour economic freedoms over fundamental rights.  
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 For instance, based on criticisms formulated against the judgments in Laval9 and 
Viking10, and hereafter the Monti II Regulation, Niklas Brunn (2012) argued that, by using the 
principle of proportionality, the ECJ’s has, to some extend, confirmed the primacy accorded 
to economic freedoms. These judgments have not called into question the role of the 
proportionality test in the resolution of conflicts between the freedom to provide services and 
the right to bring a collective action. According to him, in the European Court of Justice case 
law, primary law generally tends to take precedence over secondary law. Correspondingly, 
since posted workers are subject to different rules and employer responsibilities, Mijke 
Houwerzjil has argued that this can lead to distort competition in the freedom of goods and 
lead to “regime shopping” (2014: 30). More precisely, he suggests that employers can choose 
which regimes to be applied for their company – freedom of services and freedom of workers 
– to lower labour costs and adjust contracts and thus pursue a “race to the bottom”. Based on 
the principle of regime shopping of Houwerzjil, one may conclude that employers tend to 
play with EU legislation to their own benefits and therefore overturn fundamental social 
rights.  
 Similarly, in Labour Mobility and Wage Dumping: The Case of Norway, published in 
2014, Kristin Alsos and Line Eldring argue that the enlargement to the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe showed that the dangers for the labour market of the old Member States 
(EU15) are the result of the difference between wage costs, social conditions and industrial 
relations. This called into question the so-called “European social model” (Alsos and Eldring 
2008). In 2014, Catherine Barnard argued that the future of the ECJ case law will tell if the 
EU will be able to “square the circle” – to provide both an effective protection of fundamental 
rights and an effective compliance with economic freedoms. In Individualism: An Essay on 
the Authority of the European Union, Alexander Somek wrote that horizontally the 
completion of the single market through the elimination of any barriers to competition has 
always been the “single basis of Union power” (2008).  
 Finally, Clemens Kaupa (2013) focuses on the academic debate over the internal 
market, especially the tensions between ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ goals. Kaupa goes 																																																								
9  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 December 2007, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska 
Elektrikerförbundet, Case C-341/05 
10 Judgment of the Court 11 December 2007, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish 
Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, Case C-438/05 	
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further the abovementioned scholars by arguing that this debate highlights the very division 
over both the nature and objectives of the ‘economic objectives’ as defined in the Treaty 
(2013: 64). Even if the Court has often followed a liberal tendency when interpreting those 
objectives, the author shows that economic theory provides several ways on how to achieve 
and define the Treaty’s economic objectives. For instance, in the Viking decision, he believes 
that the Court has been accused to follow a neoliberal line of conduct because it has 
interpreted the market freedoms in a neoclassical way, thus not taking into account other 
economic possibilities (Kaupa 2013: 67). In sum, Kaupa suggests that the Court has followed 
the ‘conventional wisdom’ put forward by the economic mainstream, which is considered as 
neutral (2013: 68). He argues that the decisions of the Court cannot thus be interpreted 
through judicial activism or the nature of the European Union but rather by the various 
economic positions that it choses to follow (2013: 58). 
 Thus, overall this range of scholars tends to argue that economic arguments always 
take precedence over fundamental rights. Therefore, if judicial activism is defined as giving 
priority to economic freedoms over fundamental social rights, one could also argue 
conversely: could the promotion of social welfare, at the expense of the freedom of services, 
be charaterised in light of judicial activism? One may thus conclude that the use of judicial 
activism lies in the eyes of the observer. Put differently, the author has found that the debate 
on judicial activism has gone in many directions and the notion of judicial activism has served 
as a function of their arguments instead of being handled as a topic on its own.  
 
 E. The ECJ and the EU policy-process 
  
 Finally, a large part of scholars have worked on the political role and function of the 
ECJ. Susanne K. Schmidt (2018) wrote a book about the European Court of Justice and the 
Policy Process. She distinguishes between activism (when the Court acts beyond its 
prerogatives) and self-restraint (when the Court decides not to act). However, rather than 
focusing on whether the Court acts in an activist way or not and because of the extraordinary 
nature of the European Union, she analyses the Court’s evolution in the EU system as a whole 
(2018: 239). As a constitutional system consisting of a Treaty including numerous policy 
goals, the ECJ plays a considerable role and this can explain why there is such a degree of 
constraints exercised by the Court’s case law on both EU and Member States’ policy 
decisions. She evaluates how the European case law has had deep policy implications. 
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According to the author, the policy implications of case law are greater when the Court is 
activist (2018: 239). However, the policy implications are also present even if the Court 
refrains from acting. Moreover, according to Schmidt, at the national level, constitutional 
courts are “embedded in the national political discussion” unlike the EU Courts (Schmidt 
2018: 251). Indeed, national constitutions are more flexible than the Treaty, thus policy 
implications are much leaner for national constitutionalised case law: “if case law is not 
supported by politics, it will be overruled by secondary law in the national context” (2018: 
251). Nevertheless, the EU system makes it impossible as a Treaty change is highly difficult 
to make. The work of Schmidt is a good starting point for this thesis but it crucially lacks 
accuracy in her definitions of “judicial activism” and “judicial restraint”. 
 Similarly, Sergio Carrera and Bilyana Petkova (2013) suggest that accusations of 
judicial activism directed at the EU Courts can be linked to the expanding role that courts 
have to play nowadays. They raise two very important questions in the context of judicial 
activism: “where does the law and policy begin? How to draw the line when it comes to 
written or de facto constitution?” (Carrera and Petkova, 2013: 238). When courts have to rule 
on certain issues, they have to reach decisions on questions of principle and conduct 
‘balancing tests’ that often carry value or moral judgments (Carrera and Petkova, 2013: 237). 
However, such kinds of decisions based on moral values are considered as not appropriate for 
judges but rather fall within the competence of politicians (Carrera and Petkova, 2013: 237). 
In this perspective, they also introduce the notion of “judicial restraint” when the Court 
decides not to act. However, they both agree that the notion of “judicial activism” and 
“judicial restraint” are too vague and embody a wide range of meanings (Carrera and Petkova, 
2013: 237).  
 Mark Dawson, Bruno De Witte and Elise Muir (2013) argue that two developments in 
EU law have led to accusations of judicial activism. On the one hand, there has been an 
increasing wave of Euroscepticism, especially with regards to the “general direction taken by 
the integration process” (Dawson, De Witte and Muir 2013: 2). On the other hand, EU law 
has expanded in scope over the years. The internal market has had some policy impact in non-
economic fields, which led the Court to intervene even if the Member States retain 
competences in those fields, such as education or taxation (Dawson, De Witte and Muir 2013: 
2). Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier (2010) took the example of the Cassis de Dijon11 																																																								
11 Judgment of the Court of 20 February 1979, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 
Case C-170/78 
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decision and assess how the judicial policy of mutual recognition could have been established 
without the approach of harmonisation adopted in the Single European Act (SEA). They 
believe that the Cassis de Dijon decision is an example of how “judicial politics” play a role 
in the policy-making process in the European Community by challenging policies at the 
national level, submitting ideas to policy-makers and triggering policy processes (Alter and 
Meunier 2010: 156). More specifically, the European legal system can operate in three main 
ways. First, it can be an intermediary channel through which individual or group interests are 
represented. The Court is thus a political actor evolving in a political environment but also 
independent from the influence of the Member States as well as of the Commission (Alter and 
Meunier 2010: 156). Second, the Court is encouraged to provide ideas and thus influence the 
policy-making process (Alter and Meunier 2010: 157). Third, after submitting policy ideas, 
the Court can also provoke policy responses, such as the harmonisation process in the Cassis 
case which led Member States to negotiate Article 100b of the Single European Act (Alter 
and Meunier 2010: 157).  
 Vassilis Hatzopoulos (2013) suggests that the EU Courts’ decisions are mostly 
welcomed throughout the EU. He called into question the theories of judicial activism by 
highlighting the ways through which the EU Courts act in response to political guidance. He 
also identifies some cases where the Court acted beyond or even against the political sphere. 
However, according to Hatzopoulos, acting in such a way is not always questionable. He 
recalls that the constitutional function of the Court is to remain independent from any external 
influence and its duty is to promote dialogue between political institutions (Hatzopoulos 
2013: 111). Mark Dawson (2013) believes that a deep imbalance between the EU’s legal and 
political sphere is the result of judicial activism. While it is commonplace at the national 
level, there is a lack of ordinary dialogue between the legal and political sphere at the EU 
level due to the division of competences and the “constitutional” system set by the EU 
treaties. More specifically, he argues that because courts do not actually risk to be censured 
by any political entity, they do not look for political responsiveness (Dawson 2013: 13). 
Moreover, as a consequence of the division of competences and decision-making processes, 
the CJEU does not necessarily have the means, ability and incentives to engage in political 
debates (Dawson 2013: 5). According to the author, it is the use of constitutional 
conversations that can moderate and reduce the political effects of judicial decisions (Dawson 
2013: 13).  																																																																																																																																																																														
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 F. Main findings 
 
 Among the wide and rich literature, some categories of arguments can be 
distinguished and categorised and within each categories can also be distinguished the 
proponents and detractors. This Chapter thus confirms that the notion of judicial activism has 
become used in an extensive way without being properly explained, thus making it 
increasingly complex for the reader. Indeed, the Court has been accused of judicial activism 
in many cases: either because it has ruled in favour of one fundamental freedom over the 
others, or because it has interpreted the law in a certain way over another, or because it has 
advantaged some actors over others, or because it is said to have a political role. The main 
problem with the notion of judicial activism is that it estimates that for each legal conflict 
coming before a court, it exists an unequivocal solution, which can be identified by any 
lawyer (Keeling 1998: 508). As a consequence, if a court delivers a decision that does not 
seem to be strictly text-based and unequivocal, it means that this decision is one possible 
answer among some others, which was reached to the detriment of others on policy grounds 
and the court will thus be accused of judicial activism by those who would have chosen 
another of the solutions (Keeling 1998: 508). However, the law enshrined in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 
and the legislation adopted by the EU institutions, are much more complicated. Indeed, the 
main issue with the provisions enshrined in EU law, in particular in the founding Treaties, is 
that they are loosely written (Keeling 1998: 509). Moreover, it is crucial to remember that the 
EU institutional structure is unprecedented and unique, subject to international negotiations 
between 28 countries, which have sometimes not been able to reach an agreement, and most 
of the responsibility to resolve these disputes was left in the hands of the Court on a wide 
range of topics. This does not, in any case, call into question the quality and relevance of the 
arguments put forward by the scholars who have worked on judicial activism. But, it shows 
that this field of study crucially lacks semantic accuracy.  
 As a consequence, because this debate is confusing, it is necessary to look at the 
organisation of the European judicial architecture, the function of the judiciary and some of 
the particularities of the EU legal system, which could have led to accusations of judicial 
activism. By doing so, the objective is to shed light on what has been disregarded by most of 
the authors, i.e. the uniqueness of the EU legal system. 
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II. The European Court of Justice: an Unprecedented Judicial Architecture  	
 How the uniqueness of the European Union system has led to accusation of judicial 
activism directed against the European Court of Justice?  
 First, while encompassing a wide range of provisions, the EU Treaties fail to provide 
an adequate answer to the question of the legitimate role of the European Court of Justice 
(Dawson 2014: 423). Because the Court has to apply and implement open-ended and 
sometimes even contradictory series of legal documents and interact with many different legal 
orders with diverse constitutional traditions and way of reasoning, finding a European 
consensus on the ECJ ‘proper’ role is complex to reach (Dawson 2014: 424). Second, judges 
can often interpret in a multiple way the text. Therefore, they have diverse possibilities to 
come to an interpretation, in the absence of clear and indisputable criteria of which approach 
to use and when (Dawson 2014: 426). Third, the ECJ lacks the opportunity to engage in a 
dialogue with EU political institutions and national legislatures (Dawson 2014: 423). 
 
 A. The judicial function of the ECJ  
   
	 1. The duties of an extraordinary Court 
  
 As for any other courts, the ECJ is only entitled to solve legal disputes (Schmidt 2018: 
232). It undertakes this responsibility within the EU legal order not only as a constitutional 
but also as an administrative court. In endorsing these two roles, in accordance with the 
integrity of the European institutional order as provided for in the Treaty and in quest for the 
protection of individuals’ rights, the Court has to be entirely independent from any political 
interference12 (Hatzopoulos 2013: 103). Indeed, since the Court is supposed to keep the 
political institutions under control, it cannot be responsible before them without taking the 
risk of jeopardising its role as ‘custodian’ of the other institutions (Hatzopoulos 2013: 108). 
The Court also enjoys an important institutional legitimacy within the EU legal order: it is 
composed of 28 national judges, one per Member States and of Advocates General who 
deliver neutral and solid legal analyses, which ensure the quality of its judgments 
(Hatzopoulos 2013: 103). While one may think that the selection criteria of the judges do give 
																																																								
12 See Article 19(2) TEU 
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some margin of discretion at the national level13, Article 255 TFEU provides that a panel shall 
be set up to give an “opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform the duties of Judge and 
Advocate-General of the Court of Justice and the General Court”.   
 According to Montesquieu (1748)14, “les judges ne sont que la bouche qui prononce 
les paroles de la loi, des êtres inanimés, qui n’en peuvent modérer ni la force ni la rigueur”. 
In other words, he considers that, in a democratic regime, the judge is an "inanimate being" 
who says and applies the principles that the law has already enacted without being able to 
modify their meaning or scope. Yet, in contemporary western democratic polities, 
constitutional courts have the duty of stabilising their political systems. And due to the 
ambiguity of some constitutional provisions, courts are often in charge of addressing the issue 
of ‘incomplete contracting’ (Höreth 2013: 32). Indeed, because the European legal order has 
not been “constitutional” at the outset, it requires completing contracts – the European treaties 
(Höreth 2013: 33). This is precisely this function of ‘dispute resolvers’ of constitutional 
disputes that makes them essential in modern democracies (Höreth 2013: 32). As a 
consequence, because the courts are in charge of resolving constitutional conflicts and filling 
legislative gaps, they are involved in the process of “judicialisation of politics” which sees an 
extension of the judicial power (Höreth 2013: 32). Thus, this can explain the increasing 
influence exerting by the EU Courts: while their duties have undoubtedly been extended more 
than what their founders had in mind, they also operate and fulfil their roles in line with what 
political systems require them to do (Höreth 2013: 32).  
 In addition, it is commonly known that the European integration process has 
transformed the domestic political landscape, especially with regards to power distribution, 
including an increased transfer of sovereignty and competences from Member States to the 
European Union. The development of the EU required a shift from a solely market-oriented 
project to a construction dealing with social, environmental and economic issues as illustrated 
in the Lisbon Treaty. For instance, Article 3 of the TFEU encompasses “combating social 
exclusion” and the promotion of international sustainable development as fully integrated into 
the Union’s objectives. Partly as a consequence, the ECJ has been accused of activism 
because it has handled questions about the limits of national sovereignty for example, which 
in itself should have been dealt at the political level and not at the judicial level (Dawson 
																																																								
13 See for instance Gabel, M. (2003), “The Politics of Decision-Making in the European Court of Justice: The 
System of Chambers and Distribution of Cases for Decision”, in ECPR conference, Marburg 
14 “De l’Esprit des Lois”, Livre VI (1748)	
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2013: 12). This has led to many criticisms towards the ECJ, especially with regards to its 
alleged abuse of power over national legislature15. For example, in 2003, the European 
Parliament and Council passed the EU’s Tobacco Advertising Directive16, which bans 
tobacco advertising in the print media. This directive has been widely criticised because 
health care was an area falling within the competence of the Member States and because the 
EU did not have enough legislative competence in this policy area (Herzog and Gerken 2008). 
Another example is the ECJ judgments in Van Gend & Loos17 and Costa v Enel18, where 
Federico Mancini characterises the ECJ’s jurisprudence as taking “Community law out of the 
hands of politicians and bureaucrats and give it to people” (Mancini and Keeling 1994: 183). 
These two judgments created direct legal entitlements for individuals by enabling them to use 
rights under EU law to directly challenge national policies. Thus, those tasks the Court has to 
fulfil may partly explain why the ECJ has become among the most powerful European legal 
and legal institutions (Alter 2000: 227). In sum, the nature of the European legal order is so 
unprecedented that no other jurisdiction of a Supreme Court shape a legal order in such a way 
the jurisdiction of the ECJ shapes European law (Höreth 2013: 33). 
 
	 2. A tailor-made agenda? 	
 The theory that the European Court of Justice follows a federalist agenda has been 
widely supported19. However, it appears doubtful to think that all of the judges of the Court, 
who are designated by their respective Member States, would unanimously agree on a specific 
agenda (Keeling 1998: 531). Indeed, it is quite questionable to think that a collegiate body of 
judges can reach a coherent and commonly shared philosophy or a similar approach to their 
work (Keeling 1998: 531). As previously explained, Courts do not have any power of 
																																																								
15 See for instance Scharpf, F. (2008), “The only solution is to refuse to comply with ECJ rulings”, interview in 
Hans Böcler Stiftung. Available at: https://www.boeckler.de/66359_36456.htm  
16 Directive 2003/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and 
sponsorhip of tobacco products	
17 See Van Gend en Loos, above n 1 
18 See Costa v Enel, above n 2 
19 See for instance Neill, P. (1995), “The European Court of Justice: A Study in Judicial activism”, European 
policy forum; Saurugger, S., Terpan, F. (2014), “La Cour de Justice au cœur de la Gouvernance Européenne”, in 
Pouvoirs, n. 149, pp. 59-65 
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initiative (Keeling 1998: 531). And, the ECJ does not have the power to decide which cases 
should be brought before it or which legal issues should be addressed (Keeling 1998: 531). 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to ask whether the Court, despite those restraints, acts according 
to one principle, a guideline by which it makes legal choices.  
 On may argue that the founding Treaties do not specifically provide for the primacy of 
EU law over national law. However, in the absence of the doctrine of supremacy20, the Treaty 
would have been meaningless and the Union would have fallen apart (Keeling 1998: 532). 
According to Keeling, “(...) the Court’s overriding conviction is that the European 
Community was meant to exist, to achieve something tangible and to be founded on the rule 
of law” (1998: 532).  Indeed, one cannot expect to have a Union, which involves some 
pooling of legal sovereignty, if all the Member States are allowed to choose which European 
law is binding upon itself (Keeling 1998: 532). Thus, if the doctrine of primacy was not 
applicable, the EU would have reverted to a simple intergovernmental body and this was 
certainly not included in the project of the EU’s founding fathers (Keeling 1998: 533). This 
affirmation also holds for the Court’s case law on direct effect. The cases Van Gend en Loos21 
and Van Duyn22 have both been said to fall “outside” the ambit of the Treaty (Keeling 1998: 
533).  However, if the doctrine of direct effect was not binding, EU law would be legally 
enforceable in some Member States, whilst it would be ignored in others. As a result of the 
absence of reciprocity, the EU would probably have fallen apart if several Member States 
were under the rules of the common market whereas other Member States were subject to a 
different regime (Keeling 1998: 533).  
 Therefore, applying the doctrine of direct effect and primacy of EU law in a uniform 
way was an indispensable requirement for EU law. In conclusion, the Court does not have any 
agenda and whatever decisions a judge reaches, critics will be addressed to him. On the one 
hand, if a judge formulates new law in order to do justice, there will be critics about how he 
broke the legal path and has called into question the long-standing principles (Edmund-
Davies 1975: 13). Conversely, if a judge bases his legal reasoning only on long-standing legal 
principles, he will be accused of failing to adapt the law to new social needs (Edmund-Davies 
1975: 13). Accordingly, as put by Edmund-Davies: “By its very nature, the law is a laggard. 
The reason is not far to seek. “Law,” someone has said, “does not search out as do science 																																																								
20 See for instance Costa v Enel (Case 6-64), Simmenthal (Case 106/77) and Internationale Handelsgesellschcaft 
(Case 11/70)		
21 See Van Gend & Loos, above n 1 
22 Judgment of the Court of 4 December 1974, Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, Case 41/74	
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and medicine; it reacts to social needs and demands... The problem must arise before the law 
reacts to provide a solution. Here is where science and law differ” (1975: 2).  
 
	 3. European governance and the ECJ 	
 The ECJ is often considered as a political actor, playing a central role in European 
governance. Firstly, talking about governance with regard to the case law of the Court 
requires some precautions. As discussed above, the role of the Court, as of any jurisdiction is 
not only the “mouth of the law”. Although this runs counter to what Montesquieu envisaged, 
the Court, through its interpretations of the law, is close to play a political decision-making 
role but without substituting itself for political power (Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 65). The 
idea that the Court can deliver Praetorian interpretations is not incompatible with the fact that 
it is based on real legal reasoning. The one that led to the affirmation of the principles of 
primacy and direct effect may not be the only one possible, but it was a possible legal 
reasoning (Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 65).  
 Secondly, it seems highly doubtful to think that a small group of judges have been 
able to impose their conceptions of integration if this conception was not accepted by a 
majority of actors concerned. In addition, the Court, as such, has no means of sanction – no 
bailiff or police force that it can operate directly. Moreover, all lawyers, whether in court, in a 
national jurisdiction, in European political institutions or simply academics, do not share the 
same vision of the integration process and the role that the Court should have (Saurugger and 
Terpan 2014: 65). The example of the Constitutional Treaty, signed in 2004 but never ratified, 
with the reactions it provoked, is enough to demonstrate the lack of consensus (Saurugger and 
Terpan 2014: 65).  
 Thirdly, for the Court to emerge as a political actor, it had to be seized and it was 
necessary that other actors accept its strong power. Thus, the interests of the ECJ have met 
those of the national courts, giving rise to a jurisdictional system of which the CJEU is only 
the tip of the iceberg – the application of EU law largely falling within the jurisdiction of the 
national courts (Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 66). The national courts ‘activated’ the ECJ 
using the reference for a preliminary ruling to ask it to interpret or assess the validity of 
Community law (Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 66). And, this was done by the Dutch 
Tarifcommissie, which questioned the Court on the direct effect of the provision of the Treaty 
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of Rome on the prohibition of tariff barriers23. Generally, the national courts have found in the 
reference for a preliminary ruling an opportunity to regain power vis-à-vis the higher courts. 
Of these, some have resisted by making use of the doctrine of the acte clair, according to 
which the reference is not mandatory if the application of the norm is obvious to the internal 
judge or if the interpretation has already been given by the Court (Saurugger and Terpan 
2014: 66).  
 Thus, the European Union is a system of “dualism”, even of “constitutional 
pluralism”, which has two constitutional levels, that of the European treaties, which is the 
responsibility of the ECJ, and that of the Constitution under the responsibility of the national 
courts of the Member States (Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 67). Therefore, the Court also faces 
strong obstacles and fails to impose its conception of EU law when external conditions are not 
favourable (Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 67).  	
 B. The uncertainty of EU legislation 
  
 1. The issue of incomplete contracts 	
 In the EU legal system, the judicial process is determined by broad concepts and 
different legal traditions (Beck 2016: 484). Given that laws cannot be designed for all 
possible scenarios, the ECJ case law develops within a legal context where laws are inevitably 
incomplete contracts (Schmidt 2018: 55). Judges are in charge of interpreting these broad 
concepts and resolve the issue of incomplete contracts and this can lead to accusations of 
judicial activism. As put by Stone Sweet: “The idea of the incomplete contract is basic to a 
wide range of approaches to delegation and to courts. Generally, “contracts are said to be 
“incomplete” to the extent that there exists meaningful uncertainty as to the precise nature of 
the commitments made” (Stone Sweet 2004: 24). National legislatures have to cope with 
these incomplete contracts but which are sufficiently flexible to handle future eventualities. 
Thus, legal uncertainty arises as a result of these incomplete contracts but it can be seen as an 
indispensable requirement for integration (Schmidt 2018: 55). For Beck, legal uncertainty is 
“a universal feature of primary legal materials in all legal systems” (Beck 2016: 484). 
 In addition, legal uncertainty comes not only from the lack of clarity in the Treaty, 
which overlaps with domestic legal orders, but also from the fact that the ECJ relies on a 																																																								
23 See Van Gend en Loos, above n 1 
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balancing test in an effort to reconcile different legal orders (Schmidt 2018: 51). When 
mediating between the policy interest of the European Member States and the claims for 
integration, the Court applies a proportionality test, which means that the outcomes of its 
decisions are uncertain (Schmidt 2018: 51). Given the legal differences from one country to 
another, legal uncertainty also arises from a decision that has been reached in a specific 
context and for a specific country (Schmidt 2018: 51). Indeed, the implications of the decision 
reached might have uncertain applications for future cases. (Schmidt 2018: 51) In addition, 
the guidelines the Court provides during preliminary rulings do not result to strict policy 
regulation since, as previously mentioned, the Court is not entitled to do so (Schmidt 2018: 
51).  Furthermore, if the Court would deliver definite position on Treaty provisions, it would 
narrow its room of manoeuvre in future cases brought before it.  
 Finally, the European decision-making process also shows that legal uncertainty is a 
major issue at the supranational level (Schmidt 2018: 56). Indeed, the wide variety among the 
Member States’ interests and voting procedures inhibit the decision-making process at the EU 
level. Decisions at the EU level are taken either by qualified majority or unanimity alongside 
the involvement of the European Parliament (Schmidt 2018: 56). Thus, because those 
political decisions require common agreement and due to the lack of clarity in legal texts, 
there is a necessity for legal interpretation by the ECJ. Put differently, the European Court and 
the Commission have to cope with legal uncertainty that arises from the partial compromise 
and incomplete contracts from the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union (Schmidt 2018: 56). Thus, as a consequence of the lack of legal clarity in the Treaty, 
the Court enjoys a certain room of manoeuver in its interpretation of European law (Schmidt 
2018: 56). Stone Sweet has called this practice “zone of discretion” (2010: 12). And the 
Court’s discretion varies proportionally with the degree of legal uncertainty “in the norms 
relevant to the specific legal problems it is asked to resolve” (Beck in Schmidt 2018: 55). In 
other words, when legal uncertainty arises at the intergovernmental level, supranational actors 
may have the opportunity to extend their own powers.  
 
 2. The main characteristics of legal uncertainty  
  
 The EU legal system encompasses four different forms of legal uncertainty: “value 
pluralism” (Beck 2012), a lack of linguistic clarity, judicial precedent and, legal loopholes, 
which themselves are all intertwined.  
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 a) Absence of linguistic clarity 	
 The absence of linguistic clarity is twofold: on the one hand, the EU Treaties often 
contain vague or very limited explanations of the concepts at hand and on the other, unlike 
international or national legal orders, EU law is drafted in multiple languages. One striking 
example of the vagueness of EU Treaties provisions is the one related to the free movement 
of goods. Article 34 of the TFEU provides that “quantitative restrictions on imports, and all 
measures having equivalent effect, shall be prohibited between Member States”. This 
provision of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions is unclear (Keeling 
1998: 510). For instance, a national rule which prohibits the sale of bread except in bakery 
shops will reduce sales and imports of bread and thus will have equivalent effect as a 
quantitative restriction on imports (Keeling 1998: 510). If a court interprets Article 34 as 
such, then it does not violate Article 34. However, if a court interprets Article 34 in the 
opposite way, it cannot be considered as violating Article 34 either as it was the case in 
Commission v Greece24 with processed milk for infants. Thus, both a restricted and large 
interpretation of the scope of Article 34 does not conflict with the wording of the provision 
and a choice between both interpretations can only be a matter of policy considerations 
(Keeling 1998: 510). At that time, the Court of Justice of the EU demonstrated some 
difficulty in making a choice between those policy considerations, which led to a series of 
contradictory judgments, including Keck and Mithouard25. Indeed, the Court should ensure a 
free access to the common market to all merchants based in the Community, free trade and 
fair competition in an undistorted market. On the other hand, the Court has to refrain from 
interfering unreasonably with socio-economic policy choices of the Member States (Keeling 
1998: 511). Thus, any choice made by the Court would have been based, in any case, on 
policy considerations (Keeling 1998: 511). However, any judicial body asked to interpret 
vague and general provisions, such as Article 34, has no other choice than performing a law-
making role. When a judge is confronting to several possible interpretations in a situation 
where no precedent can be found, he necessarily creates a new law (Keeling 1998: 511). As 
																																																								
24 Judgment of the Court of 29 June 1995, Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, Case 
C-391/92	
25 Judgment of the Court of 24 November 1993, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel 
Mithouard, Joined cases C-297/91 and C-268/91 
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put by Lord Edmund-Davies: “the simple and certain fact is that judges inevitably act as 
legislators” (1975: 2). Similarly, Keeling said: “The expression of “creative jurisprudence” 
(...) that gives non-obvious answers to questions for which there is no obvious answer, is 
especially absurd in this context: for whatever the Court did with such scant material, its 
jurisprudence was bound to be creative” (Keeling 1998: 512). 
 In addition, EU legal uncertainty arises from the fact that EU law is drafted in all EU 
official languages, which are all uniformly reliable (Beck 2012: 174). The principle of “multi-
lingualism” applies to EU legislation, EU Treaties and the Court of Justice’s case law. For 
instance, the Estonian wording of any legislative provision is equally authoritative as that of 
the same provision in Spanish. Thus, this implies that the terminology of any language 
version of whichever provision in a Court’s decision is reliable (Beck 2012: 174). However, 
concepts, linguistic symbols and vocabulary of one language cannot always be precisely 
translated into another language without risking to slightly change its meaning. 
 
 b) Value pluralism and the equality of norms before law 
  
 Value pluralism is well established in the EU legal order. It means that there are 
different values, which might be considered as equally elementary and crucial but which 
might also conflict with each other (Beck 2012: 77). Article 2 and 3 of the Treaty on the 
European Union include most of the EU legal values and objectives. Those latter do not only 
lack conceptual clarity but also often conflict with each other. Examples of value pluralism in 
the objectives of the TEU encompass the conflict between freedom and security or, more 
generally, between freedom and the principles of democracy and solidarity for example (Beck 
2012: 176). The fact that these values are equally important implies that there does not exist 
any rational criteria to balance one value against another (Beck 2012: 177). Therefore, value 
pluralism and the equality of norms before law generates legal uncertainty since judges do not 
have any guidance on how to deal with legal values that are in conflict (Beck 2012: 77).  In 
addition, since the Lisbon Treaty, fundamental rights are now enforceable as are the four 
freedoms, i.e. freedom of movement of goods, services, capitals and labour (Beck 2012: 177). 
Formally, the Court has made the protection of fundamental rights a genuine public policy 
objective, which “may justify proportionate interference with any of the four fundamental 
freedoms of movement” (Beck 2012: 178). For instance, in Schmidberger, the Court said that 
once a freedom poses a threat to the right in question, there is a need to protect it in order to 
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lessen the interference with the freedom of movement. Reciprocally, when a fundamental 
freedom has breached a fundamental right, it is complex to determine whether this breach was 
proportionate or not (Beck 2012: 178).  
 
 c) Judicial precedent  	
 In this thesis, the notion of ‘precedent’ should be understood in a broad sense as any 
legal statements made by any higher court which are commonly accepted guidelines within a 
legal order, or considered as consistent for the interpretation of future cases (Beck 2012: 92). 
When there is a legal precedent, it gives the general orientation for interpreting the case on a 
specific topic (Beck 2012: 106). However, precedent only provides bases for interpretation, 
which can be inadequate for some reasons given the context and topic at hand and thus it must 
be balanced. Indeed, these statements are not absolute, cannot anticipate every situation and 
close every legal gap. Thus, courts will automatically have to close legal loopholes by 
creating precedents themselves (Beck 2012: 106). While, the judge is supposed to make 
reference to the law when solving legal disputes, the law, as a social construct, has to be 
adapted to any dispute or situation according to the context and facts (Stone Sweet 2004: 9-
10). Judicial precedents, which provide guidelines as to the interpretation of written rules, are 
expected to somewhat avoid the uncertainty originating from the lack of linguistic clarity and 
value pluralism in EU legal instruments, but also to close legal loopholes also present in the 
EU legal order (Beck 2012: 92). Nevertheless, linguistic vagueness and value conflicts are 
also apparent in judge-made rules. As Beck put: “Precedents thus create their own legal 
uncertainty which is further reinforced by rule instability which is a specific feature and 
further source of uncertainty in judge-made norms” (2012: 92).  
 
 d) Legal loopholes 	
 As previously discussed, some fields of EU law are incomplete and this creates legal 
uncertainty. Vassilis Hatzopoulos (2012) conducted a quantitative study on the case law on 
services between January 1958 and June 2009. His study corroborates the belief that some 
areas of EU legislation on services have been left idle. For instance, as of 2012, there have 
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been 92 CJEU cases on the interpretation of the Public Procurement Directive26 without 
having recourse to the Treaty (Hatzopoulos 2012: 217). By leaving many provisions of the 
TFEU open to several interpretations, the founding fathers of the Treaties undoubtedly 
expected the Court to play a law-making role (Keeling 1998: 511-12). For instance, the 
provisions laid down in Articles 36 to 42 do not constitute a complete and specific set of rules 
supervising trade in goods between Member States (Keeling 1998: 511). The fathers of the 
Treaties drafted general guidelines and left “others” to fill the details. And this task was left to 
the European Court, which had to establish the scope of these articles. In this regard, 
concerning the Court’s legal reasoning, Lord Mackenzie Stuart put: “(...) if, from time to 
time, you are tempted to think that in its search for a solution the European Court has made 
too much or too little, please remember the spirit that has informed the attempt” (1977: 63).  
 
 C. The absence of an institutional dialogue between the EU judiciary and legislative 
 branches 
 
Under national constitutional frameworks, individuals are usually allowed to contest 
enacted laws on constitutional or other grounds. However, this right is normally accompanied 
by a degree of scrutiny by Courts with regards to legislators and, conversely, legislators are 
allowed to respond to Courts’ rulings when those latter invalidate national legislation 
(Dawson 2013: 12).  At the EU level, the mechanisms of political response to judicial 
decisions are inhibited due to the very institutional structure of the EU (Dawson 2013: 12). 
The lack of dialogue between the legislative and judiciary branches of the EU institutional 
system, which is supposed to limit the political outcomes of judicial decisions, might also be 
partly a cause for accusation of judicial activism (Dawson 2013: 13). Since Courts are not 
reasonably threatened of censorship by political institutions, they do not have reasons to 
answer politically to ECJ’s judgments (Dawson 2013: 13). One of the consequences is that 
the ECJ’s decisions do not contain sufficiently developed arguments, which in turn inhibits 
the opportunities for a dialogue with the legislature. In addition, due to the division of 
competences and decision-making procedures set out in the Treaty, the legislative branch 
does not necessarily have the resources and capabilities to respond to Court’s decisions 
																																																								
26 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public work contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts 
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(Dawson 2013: 13). And this often leads to vague responses formulated by the legislature and 
issues of interpretation for the ECJ.  
 A well-known example of a case where EU legislation responded to Court’s rulings in 
an ambiguous or inconsistent way, which posed interpretative issue for the Court, is the set of 
decisions concerning posted workers, especially the ECJ’s Laval27 decision. Some countries 
were fearful that they could loss competitiveness if the “host country principle were to apply” 
(Cremers et al. 2006: 207).  The main concern was that if wages and labour conditions were 
lowered, it could lead to a distortion of competition and thus to “social dumping”.  When the 
Posted Workers Directive28 was adopted, it was concluded that the working conditions of 
posted workers must comply with the legislation of the country to which they are posted – the 
host country. However, the posting company continues to pay social security contributions in 
the country where it is usually employed. In order to reach a compromise between the 
countries pleading for higher standards of worker protection and more liberal states, the 
resulting text was left vague and contained possibly contradictory provisions.  This led the 
Court of Justice, in Viking29 and Laval, to rule on the relationship between fundamental 
freedoms (freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment) and fundamental social 
rights (in particular the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining) in the field of 
transnational litigation. In other words, the ECJ had to make a choice between two conflicting 
interpretations and this led to accusations of judicial activism30.  
 This imbalance between EU law and politics can be partly due to the difference 
between the EU’s judiciary and its legislative competence. The division of competences sets 
the limits between the EU Member States’ power and those of the Union. It is also an effort 
towards the creation of a ‘competence catalogue’31, which defines the areas where the Union 
can legitimately intervene (Dawson 2013: 14).  This would explain why EU citizens express 
disappointment when EU Courts adjudicate in policy fields that are under national 
																																																								
27 See Laval, above n 8	
28 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services 
29 See Viking, above n 9 
30 See for instance, Barnard, C. (2014), ‘’Free Movement and Labour Rights: Squaring the Circle?’’, in 
Regulating Transnational Labour in Europe: The quandaries of multilevel governance, 325-351; Bruun, N. 
(2012), ‘’European Economic, Employment and Social Policy: Critical Assessment of the Proposed Monti II 
Regulation’’, in ETUI Policy Brief 4, 1-5 
31 See Articles 3-6 of the TFEU 
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competence (Dawson 2013: 14). However, under the EU legal system, even if the policy field 
in question falls within the competence of Member States, the latter should always comply 
with EU law when they exercise this competence32 (Dawson 2013: 14). Thus, one of the 
consequences of this formulation is that it can make some of the national policies, in the field 
of health or education for instance, prejudicial to EU rules. According to Dawson, under EU 
law, this “discrepancy between competence and jurisdiction is not more than a logical 
counterpart to the supremacy principle” (2013: 14). Indeed, the coherence and efficiency of 
EU law would be undermined if every national measure in breach of EU market freedoms 
were taking precedence over EU law (Dawson 2013: 14). It should also be mentioned that this 
discrepancy between jurisdiction and competence is not only an attribute of the EU. Indeed, it 
can also be observed in other constitutional systems where constitutional courts are able to 
overrule rules adopted at regional or local levels of government in areas falling outside federal 
competence (Dawson 2013: 15). Thus, while this practice has rarely been constitutionally 
challenged in other multi-level jurisdictions, it seems questionable to do it at the EU level and 
then accused the Court of judicial activism (Dawson 2013: 15).   
III. The State of the Art: a Typology of Judicial Activism  
 
 As previously mentioned, the academic literature on the topic contains a number of 
gaps that still need to be filled. Indeed, the notion of judicial activism remains excessively 
broad and encompasses many aspects of the ECJ’s case law. Judicial activism is nothing more 
than a word used to express disagreement or criticise the Court’s reasoning in a judgment. 
However, given the great complexity of the European legal system, it seems insufficient to 
use only one notion when analysing the legal reasoning of the ECJ. That is why a typology is 
necessary in order to draw clear boundaries between the different uses of judicial activism and 
to broaden the lexical field of the literature on this topic. In this contribution, judicial activism 
is defined less inclusively but yet more precisely than the definitions presented in Chapter I.  
 Thus, the author proposes below in Table 1 a typology of judicial activism to allow 
tighter specification of the types of ECJ’s legal reasoning. The author’s typology consists of 
five categories, based on the degree of the Court’s intervention in the policy process, across 
different sectors, or its abstention. Instead of creating a controversial typology made of 
neologisms, the author has chosen to use conventional terms that are mainstream in the 																																																								
32 See for instance Laval, above n 8	
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popular and political discourse so that their use is easy. In addition, the labels embody a 
descriptive aspect so that their use are understandable and easily applicable. Finally, the labels 
are voluntarily value-neutral to refrain from importing ideological theories into interpretative 
reasoning based on the categories.  
 
Table 1. A typology* of ECJ judicial activism 
 
* The categories are not absolute and can be used either individually or in combination. For instance, 
the Court can both act beyond what is provided for the in the Treaty (judicial discretion) and expand 
the scope of EU legal bases (judicial creativity) as it was the case in Vlassopoulou.  
* Given that the ECJ’s case law is subject to constant evolution for the reasons explained in Chapter II 
of this contribution, this typology is not frozen in time and can also be extended or reviewed.  
* The categories are easy to use if one or more legal cases are sufficiently researched, taking into 
account that the ECJ’s behaviour is complex. 
Types of 
Judicial 
Activism 
Definitions Case Law examples 
Judicial 
Passivism 
The Court decides not to act by declaring 
the case as falling outside the scope of EU 
law. 
Ex: EU-Turkey Statement on the 
return of illegal migrant crossing 
from Turkey to the Greek islands. 
Judicial 
Formalism 
The Court decides to act but in a formalist 
way without taking into account the 
purpose of the case, the circumstances and 
the intentions of the Member States. 
Ex: A.S. and Jafari cases on the 
non-respect of the Dublin first 
state-of-entry rule across the 
Western Balkans route. 
Judicial 
Enthusiasm  
 
The Court acts preater legem, i.e. the Court 
submits policy ideas to policy-makers when 
political institutions have left some gaps in 
legislation. 
Ex: Corbeau, Almelo and 
Glökner cases on the role of 
Member States and the EU in 
defining and financing services 
of general interests. 
Judicial 
Dynamism 
The Court acts substitutio legis, i.e. the 
Court expands the scope of EU legal bases. 
Ex: Cassis de Dijon case on the 
principle of mutual recognition. 
Judicial 
Creativity 
The Court acts contra legem, i.e. the Court 
goes beyond what is provided for in the 
Treaty: in areas reserved to the Member 
States. 
Ex: Vlassopoulou and Thieffry 
cases on the freedom of 
movement of workers. 
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 A. Judicial Passivism 
 
 Judicial passivism appears when the Court chooses not to use its powers in cases 
where it is supposed. More specifically, the Court decides not to adjudicate by claiming that it 
lacks jurisdiction in a certain situation, i.e. the case falls outside the scope of EU law (Goldner 
Lang 2018: 76). A clear example of this is the judgments of the Court on the EU-Turkey 
Statement in 201733. The EU-Turkey Statement provides that any “new irregular migrants 
crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to 
Turkey”34. An Afghan national and two Pakistani nationals, who were worried that they could 
be returned from Greece to Turkey in the event of the rejection of their asylum application by 
the Greek authorities, asked the General Court to verify the legality of the EU-Turkey 
Statement (Goldner Lang 2018: 77). However, the Court refused to act and dismissed the 
cases by declaring that they were falling outside the scope of EU law. The General Court 
agreed in its judgments with the EU institutions, which argued that the Statement was not 
drafted by them but was prepared by the EU Member States and, as shown by the content of 
the communication of 16 March 201635, it is in fact an international agreement36. Thus, the 
Court ordered that it lacks the jurisdiction to hear and determine the action and chose not to 
act whether it was a “legally binding agreement” or a “political arrangement reached by the 
Members of the European Council, [that is to say,] the Heads of State or Government of the 
Member States, the President of the European Council and the President of the 
Commission37”. In other words, the Court concluded that it is not the European Council that 
adopted the EU-Turkey Statement but it is the EU Heads of State or Government and the 
Turkish Prime Minister who endorsed it. Hence it is clearly an example of judicial passivism 
since the Court declared that the EU-Turkey Statement was not a EU act in accordance with 
Article 263 TFEU (Goldner Lang 2018: 78). This decision means that related agreements 
with third countries could be concluded, “outside the scope of EU law and exempt from the 
judicial review of the CJEU” (Goldner Lang 2018: 79). However, it is uncertain whether the 																																																								
33 EU-Turkey statement, 18 march 2016. Available here: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/pdf  
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid 
36 Order of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) of 28 February 2017, NG v European 
Council, Case T-193/16, para 40 
37 Ibid, para 30	
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Court of Justice will follow the same line of arguments and narrow its scope by excluding an 
entire body of cases from its jurisdiction (Goldner Lang 2018: 79).  
 
 B. Judicial Formalism 
 
 Judicial formalism happens when the Court uses its judicial power in a formalistic and 
strict way, thus straying from its usual teleological approach. More specifically, the Court 
does not take into account the global objective and pattern of the applicable norm, the motives 
of the Member States, the facts and details of the case (Goldner Lang 2018: 81). A clear 
example of this may be found in the Court’s decision in A.S.38 and Jafari39. These cases deal 
with the non-application of the Dublin state-of-first entry rule across the Western Balkans 
route (Goldner Lang 2018: 81). A high number of people embarked upon this route between 
September 2015 and March 2016, which implied to depart from the Middle East passing by 
Turkey and Greece, Western Balkans countries and European Eastern and Central countries to 
arrive in Austria and Germany (Goldner Lang 2018: 81). The authorities of the Western 
Balkan countries and EU Western Member States allowed and eased the route. A.S and Jafari 
cases respectively involved a Syrian and two Afghan nationals who crossed the border 
between Croatia and Serbia while not having a valid visa. The Croatian authorities arranged 
them to be transported to the Croatian-Slovenian border and then help them to go to Austria 
and Slovenia in order to apply for international protection there40. Nevertheless, both Austria 
and Slovenia refused to review their application on the ground that, since the applicants 
illegally entered Croatia, pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation41, it was the responsibility of 
the authorities of the country of first entry to examine their applications for international 
protection. By its judgments, the Court observed that the “crossing of a border in breach of 																																																								
38 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 July 2017, A.S. v Republika Slovenija, Case C-490/16 
39 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 July 2017, Khadija Jafari and Zainab Jafari, Case C-646/16 
40 Court of Justice of the European Union, “Judgment in Cases C-490/16 A.S. v Slovenia Republic and C-646/16 
Khadija Jafari and Zainab Jafari”, Press Release No 86/17, 26 July 2017. Available here:  
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-07/cp170086en.pdf  
41 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person. 
Available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:PDF 
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the conditions imposed by the rules applicable in the Member State concerned must 
necessarily be considered ‘irregular’42” within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the Dublin III 
Regulation. The Court also considered that such an entry should be regarded as irregular, even 
if it occurs in the course of an unusual large inflow of third country nationals into the EU43. 
However, the Court noted that, in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, transfers of third country nationals into the EU must be precluded if there is a genuine 
risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of the person concerned if transferred44. The Court 
ruled that admission is  “valid only in respect of the territory of the Member State concerned, 
not the territory of the other Member States45”. Therefore, the Court held Croatia responsible 
for reviewing the asylum applications of A. S. and the Jafari sisters46. By the same token, the 
Court also held Croatia responsible for reviewing applications for international protection of 
any third-country nationals who crossed its border during the 2015-2016 migration crisis47.  
 These two judgments can be characterised as judicial formalism in the way the Court 
overlooked the global objective and scheme of the Dublin Regulation and EU asylum law but 
also the events happening in the Western Balkans route and the goals of the Member States, 
which provided support to facilitate the route (Goldner Lang 2018: 83). Thus, the Court 
strayed from its usual teleological and flexible approach by interpreting strictly the Dublin 
Regulation, which disregards Recital 5 of the Dublin Regulation providing for “objective, fair 
criteria both for the Member State and for the person concerned” for determining the Member 
State responsible for the examination of application for international protection (Goldner 
Lang 2018: 83). In addition, the Court refused to deny the state-of-first-entry rule on the 
ground of the unusual large number of individuals across the Western Balkans route.  
 
 C. Judicial Enthusiasm 
 
 Judicial enthusiasm happens when the Court acts substitutio legis, i.e. when the Court 
both underlines the necessity for fresh legislation and gives the adequate legal basis for it 
																																																								
42 Ibid 
43 See Jafari, above n 35, para 93 
44 See Court of Justice of the European Union, above n 36 
45 Ibid 
46 See Jafari, above n 35, para 60 
47 Ibid	
May BARTH  The Different Sides of Judicial Activism at  
the European Court of Justice 
	 35	
(Hatzopoulos 2013: 118). When the Treaty is silent on some matter, the Court is not officially 
entitled to create new legislation. However, it can broaden the scope of existing legal bases, 
therefore pushing the legislature to act. An example of this is the Court’s set of judgments 
regarding the posting of workers. Articles 56 and 57 TFEU do not provide sufficiently clear 
legal bases with regards to their content and delivery modes and the Court had to precise the 
content of the notion of services (Hatzopoulos 2013: 118). Thus, even if the Court was not 
confronted with the issue of posted workers before 1982, it already addressed the scope of 
application of the service rules of the Treaty (Hatzopoulos 2013: 118). In Evi v Seco48, Rush 
Portugesa49 and Vander Elst50, the Court decided that both the employer who sends a worker 
in another Member State and the worker himself could benefit from some social protection 
under the Treaty (Hatzopoulos 2013: 119). These judgments set up three important principles: 
it became much easier in terms of administrative requirements for service providers to move 
across EU Member States; they may still, however, have to abide by the legislation of the host 
Member State regarding working conditions such as minimum salaries; and they may not 
have to abide by every social security obligations for workers who are already covered in the 
service provider’s Member State of origin, unless these obligations enhance the protection of 
the workers (Hatzopoulos 2013: 119). They also called on the legislature to act upon two 
main points. First, the legislature can now base his reasoning on the Services Chapter of the 
Treaty when regulating the posting of workers (Hatzopoulos 2013: 119). Second, these 
judgments called on the legislature to address the critical issue of posted workers’ wage 
(Hatzopoulos 2013: 119).  
 When the Posted Workers Directive51 was drafted, it was deemed to guarantee that 
primary employment regulations of the host state should apply to all posted workers. 
However, the Court undermined the scope of application of the Directive in Commission v 
Luxembourg52 by preventing the host state from applying its national legislation to posted 																																																								
48 Judgment of the Court of 3 February 1982, Société anonyme de droit français Seco and Société anonyme de 
droit français Desquenne & Giral v Etablissement d'assurance contre la vieillesse et l'invalidité, Joined cases 62 
and 63/81 
49  Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 March 1990, Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Office national 
d'immigration, Case C-113/89 
50 Judgment of the Court of 9 August 1994, Raymond Vander Elst v Office des Migrations Internationales, Case 
C-43/93 
51 Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services 
52 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 19 June 2008, Commission of the European Communities v Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg, Case C-319/06	
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workers. The Court held that the existence of an additional obligation in the host Member 
States to which the posted worker is already subject in its own Member State is unnecessary 
and is likely to dissuade undertakings established in another Member State from exercising 
their freedom to provide services53. In doing so, the Court has called into question the 
applicability of the Posted Workers Directive and underlined the need for new legislation 
regarding the posting of workers (Hatzopoulos 2013: 122). And it has led the Commission in 
March 2012 to propose a draft Directive54  to complete the Posted Workers Directive 
(Hatzopoulos 2013: 122). Thus, the Court has highlighted that the Directive was loosely 
drafted and encouraged the legislature to act upon it (Hatzopoulos 2013: 122).  
 
 D. Judicial Dynamism 
 
 Judicial dynamism appears when, even if the Treaty provides a legal basis, the 
political institutions do not properly administer. In this case, the Court is said to act preater 
legem, i.e. the Court may be responsible to convict the political institutions for “failure to act” 
(Hatzopoulos 2013: 112). Nevertheless, the Court is able to do so only when a mandatory 
deadline is provided for in the Treaty and when one of the institutions decides to bring the 
case before the CJEU (Hatzopoulos 2013: 112). For instance, the Council was convicted 
when it failed to endorse the measures related to a common transport policy55 (Hatzopoulos 
2013: 112). In its judgment, the Court made it clear that “the first paragraph of Article 175 
expressly gives a rights of action for failure to act against the Council and Commission inter 
alia to ‘the other institutions of the community’. It thus gives the same right of action to all 
the community institutions. It is not possible to restrict the exercise of that right by one of 
them without adversely affecting its status as an institution under the Treaty56”. Thus, the 
Court is not acting in conflict with any legal statutes or written regulation. As previously 
explained in this contribution, because the Treaty contains some legal gaps and has been 
drafted at a given point of time, there is sometimes the need for fresh legislation according to 
																																																								
53 Ibid para 41 
54 COM(2012) 131 final of 21.3.2012, Proposal for a Directive on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services 
55 Judgment of the Court of 22 May 1985, European Parliament v Council of the European Communities, Case 
13/83 
56 Ibid, summary of the judgment, para 1 
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the evolution of the social context (Hatzopoulos 2013: 112). In these circumstances, the 
Court, through its jurisprudence, often highlights these legal gaps left by the political 
institutions and provokes the necessity for new legislation and this is called judicial 
dynamism. One way of doing so is to recognise the direct effect of the measure “left idle” 
(Hatzopoulos 2013: 112). The Court proceeded like this when it elaborated on the concept of 
“services of general economic interest”. In 1971, the provision was first brought before the 
Court but the latter denied the opportunity for individuals to invoke it57. However, the Court 
changed its mind in 199158. As a consequence, the Court delivered three crucial judgments, 
Glöckner59, Almelo60 and Corbeau61, where it outlined the specific roles of the EU and of its 
Member States to define and organise services of general interests (Hatzopoulos 2013: 113).  
 
 E. Judicial Creativity 
  
 Judicial creativity happens when the Court acts contra legem, i.e. the Court goes 
beyond what is provided for in the Treaty. Indeed, the Court has sometimes pushed for the 
creation of EU law and developed a body of case law in areas, which fall within the 
competence of the EU Member States as provided for in the Treaty (Hatzopoulos 2013: 124). 
An example of this is education. Since the Maastricht Treaty, Article 165 TFEU provides that 
the “Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States” but in full respect of the responsibility of the Member 
States regarding the “content of teaching, the organisation of education systems and their 
cultural and linguistic diversity”. In 1977, the Court considered that refusing access to an 
employment to an individual solely on the ground that the latter is not in possession of the 
																																																								
57 Judgment of the Court of 14 July 1971, Ministère public luxembourgeois v Madeleine Muller, Veuve J.P. Hein 
and others, Case 10-71 
58 Judgment of the Court of 18 June 1991, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia 
Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others, 
Case C-260/89 
59 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 25 October 2001, Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis 
Südwestpfalz, Case C-475/99 
60 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 September 2006, N v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst 
Oost/kantoor Almelo, Case C-470/04 
61 Judgment of the Court of 19 May 1993, Criminal proceedings against Paul Corbeau, Case C-320/91	
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“national diploma corresponding to the diploma which he holds” was against the law62. In 
addition, in Vlassoupoulou, the Court provided that if the foreign diploma corresponds only 
partially to those required by the national provisions, the host Member State can request the 
person concerned to provide a proof of knowledge and qualifications, which are lacking63. 
These judgments constrained the Member States since they are now obliged to recognise 
foreign qualifications (Hatzopoulos 2013: 127). It should also be mentioned that in 1998/99, 
the Member States established the Bologna system outside the EU framework, which includes 
non-EU Member States and intend to harmonise the European Higher Education system 
(Hatzopoulos 2013: 128). Thus, the body of case law mentioned above reveals that the 
Court’s actions may have an impact both within and outside the EU framework as non-EU 
Member States also take part in the Bologna system. The Bologna case also shows that the 
Court can rely on soft law instruments and non-binding engagements to foster EU objectives, 
such as free movement of workers (Hatzopoulos 2013: 128).   
CONCLUSION  
  
 From the early use of the notion of judicial activism in the late 1940s, the scope of 
judicial activism has constantly developed with the development of an ever more powerful 
European Court of Justice. It has even become fully integrated into the study of the European 
Union. Yet, this thesis confirmed that the notion of judicial activism is a loose term used by 
the media, in the popular discourse and politics to cover a wide a range of different attitudes 
of the European Court of Justice. And, many scholars did not called into question the notion 
and applied it to various cases when they deem that the Court deviates from its judicial 
powers as defined in the Treaties or when it fosters some values over the others. Although 
based on solid arguments, the authors defend the idea of an audacious Court but they are not 
always able to avoid the “normative” trap (Saurugger and Terpan 2014: 60). The temptation 
exists for some to highlight the beneficial influence of the Court on the integration process. 
Others criticise its role in the name of a certain conception of democracy, comparing the 
activism of the Court to a government of judges. In this contribution, this was not a matter of 
																																																								
62 Judgment of the Court of 28 April 1977, Jean Thieffry v Conseil de l’ordre des avocats à la cour de Paris, 
Case 71-76, para 4 
63  Judgment of the Court of 7 May 1991, Irène Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und 
Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Württemberg, Case C-340/89, para 19	
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defending the integrative role played by the Court, or of denouncing a new form of 
government of judges, but of examining the role of the Court, beyond the prejudices, which 
too often distorts the analysis. Thus, despite the wide and rich literature on judicial activism, 
the author discovered that the main problem was not whether the Court was activist or not, 
but it was the notion of “activism” in itself. Therefore, an analysis of the specificities of the 
EU legal system was needed in order to grasp the roots of the controversy.  
 The European Court of Justice presents similar characteristics with other legal systems 
but it has also some specific aspects that cannot be found at the national level. The ECJ 
provides national courts with general legal guidance regarding the interpretation of EU law in 
preliminary procedures but these are different from strict policy rules. Thus, the Court is not 
legitimate to formulate general policy rules (Schmidt 2018: 232). However, due to the nature 
of the EU legal order made of incomplete contracts, the Court has a heavy responsibility. 
Indeed, the fact that the Treaty contains a large number of material details means that judicial 
policy-making partially becomes a substitute to legislative policy-making since it necessarily 
has to be included in the reasoning of the latter (Schmidt 2018: 123). The ECJ, as the engine 
of integration, has to promote a legal system where national courts, unaccustomed with 
European law, must fully apply and respect it (Schmidt 2018: 51). Thus, unlike Montesquieu, 
this thesis argued that attempts to examine and study the CJEU and its legal reasoning in a 
strict and rigid way would disregard issues of legal uncertainty, i.e. linguistic clarity, legal 
loopholes, judicial precedent and value pluralism, which characterise EU legislation. Indeed, 
as demonstrated in Chapter II, the Court had to decide on many of the orientations and level 
of integration and harmonisation in areas where the Member States were unable or unwilling 
to decide in the Treaties, often due to a lack of political will and agreement on some matters. 
Because the final agreement is the result of lengthy diplomatic dialogues and political 
compromises, the language emanating from such legal texts is often highly ‘codified’, leaving 
the Court responsible for its interpretation. The Court has endorsed this role by following a 
communautaire approach and working to reconcile norm pluralism and legal uncertainty, 
taking into consideration both political sensitivity and the limits of an integrationist judicial 
orientation (Beck 2012: 242).  
 Therefore, the sole notion of “judicial activism” cannot refer to every case where the 
Court has delivered judgments deemed controversial. The typology then obtained offers a set 
of five categories to differentiate between the various types of judicial activism. Judicial 
Passivism will be useful to characterise situations where the Court restraints itself from acting 
because it deems the case as falling outside its competence. Judicial Formalism can be used in 
May BARTH  The Different Sides of Judicial Activism at  
the European Court of Justice 
	 40	
situations where the Court strays away from its teleological approach and adopts a strict 
interpretation of the law. If the Court submits policy ideas to policy-makers in areas where the 
law is silent, then it falls within the category of judicial enthusiasm. However, if the Court 
expands the scope of EU legal bases, then one would talk about judicial dynamism. Finally, 
judicial creativity happens when the Court acts beyond what is provided for in the Treaty. 
This typology is voluntarily value-neutral and has the advantage of being easy to use. It also 
carries implications for further academic debate regarding explanations of judicial activism. 
Indeed, due to the legal uncertainty of the Court’s case law, this typology is non-exhaustive 
and the categories can be extended or subject to adjustment across time.  
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